This article considers the topic of the prior parental right in the education of their children, unequivocally asserted in the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights. Discussion focuses upon the origins and nature of this right as it is described in Catholic Church teaching as well as the Supreme Court’s 1925 decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, both of which antedate and provide principled support for UDHR’s assertion. The purpose here is to use these principles to identify the injustice (...) arising when a State or its agents deny parental choice in education by limiting that choice to public schools. In the United States, this action imperils the foundation of UDHR’s goal that education be “the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”. (shrink)

We explain the thesis that human mental states are ontologically emergent aspects of a fundamentally biological organism. We then explore the consequences of this thesis for the identity of a human person over time. As these consequences are not obviously independent of one's general ontology of objects and their properties, we consider four such accounts: transcendent universals, kind-Aristotelianism, immanent universals, and tropes. We suggest there are reasons for emergentists to favor the latter two accounts. We then argue that within such (...) ontologies, emergentism about properties pushes one to the stronger claim that there are emergent individuals, though not individuals which are dual to person's bodies—substance emergentism, but not substance dualism. (shrink)

As conceptual and theoretical discussions on environmental valuation approaches have advanced there is growing interest in the impact that valuation has on decision making. The perceived legitimacy of the outputs of valuation studies is seen as one factor influencing their impact on policy decisions. One element of this is ensuring that participants of valuation processes see the results as legitimate and would be willing to accept decisions based on these findings. Here, we test the perceived legitimacy to participants of two (...) approaches to deliberative monetary valuation, deliberated preferences and Deliberative Democratic Monetary Valuation, in the context of marine planning in the Clyde estuary in Scotland. We compare and contrast deliberated preference and deliberative democratic monetary valuation and track their emergence as responses to critiques of conventional stated preference approaches. We then present the results of our case study where we found that deliberative democratic monetary valuation produced valuations that were perceived as more legitimate that deliberated preference as the basis for decision making by those involved in the valuation process. (shrink)

Freedom and moral responsibility have one foot in the practical realm of human affairs and the other in the esoteric realm of fundamental metaphysics—or so we believe. This has been denied, especially in the metaphysics-bashing era occupying the first two-thirds or so of the twentieth century, traces of which linger in the present day. But the reasons for this denial seem to us quite implausible. Certainly, the argument for the general bankruptcy of metaphysics has been soundly discredited. Arguments from Strawson (...) and others that our moral practices are too deeply embedded in human life to rest on anything as tenuous as a metaphysical doctrine far from the thoughts of ordinary people would seem to prove too much: we can easily imagine fantastic scenarios far from the thoughts of ordinary people—involving, say, alien manipulation or massive deception—that, if true, would clearly undermine claims to freedom and responsibility. For still other philosophers, the separation of the moral life from (some) metaphysical issues is prescriptive, not descriptive: it is a recommendation that we revise ordinary moral thought by severing its allegedly problematic links to metaphysics. (Some philosophers appear to hover undecided between such a prescriptive project and a Strawsonian descriptive claim.) We suspect that the prospects of retaining the binding force of ordinary moral thought, were such a reconceived moral practice widely embraced, are bleak. A transition to something closer to moral nihilism seems at least as likely. In any case, our interest here is in descriptive metaphysics, not revisionary. -/- To say as we do that freedom and moral responsibility have a partly metaphysical character is not to suggest that they can be had only if some highly specific version of a particular metaphysical framework is correct. Instead, we suggest in what follows, it is a broadly neo-Humean metaphysics that is not hospitable to freedom (for reasons distinctive to the metaphysics), while a broadly neo-Aristotelian metaphysics is. But we also think (and it is the main aim of our paper to show) that different versions of the neo- Aristotelian metaphysics lead to rather different metaphysical accounts of free and responsible action. Specifically, we will argue that (1) the most satisfactory account of human freedom within the broadly neo-Aristotelian metaphysics is agent-causal, but that (2) two different versions of the general metaphysics will lead to important differences in the agent-causal account of freedom. Adjust the details of your general metaphysics, and the details of your account of freedom are transformed in significant ways. Action theory cannot properly be pursued in isolation from general metaphysics. (shrink)

We present an original emergent individuals view of human persons, on which persons are substantial biological unities that exemplify metaphysically emergent mental states. We argue that this view allows for a coherent model of identity-preserving resurrection from the dead consistent with orthodox Christian doctrine, one that improves upon alternatives accounts recently proposed by a number of authors. Our model is a variant of the “falling elevator” model advanced by Dean Zimmerman that, unlike Zimmerman’s, does not require a closest continuer account (...) of personal identity. We end by raising some remaining theological concerns. (shrink)

In their target article, Millum and Bromwich situate their article against a backdrop of well-documented empirical research demonstrating that many participants have variable and often poor...

In this paper, we will critically examine the notion of rationality and the disabling instinct of self-preservation that play out in human relationships. That “man is a rational animal,” as Aristotle declared is usually taken for granted in social studies. But whether humans act rationally all the time, and in all circumstances remains questionable. Here, we shall investigate this concern from a decolonial perspective by engaging some contradictions thrown up in the context of coloniality within which a section of humanity (...) dehumanizes the rest. The question then is, how rational is the intellectual program of coloniality? Taking a cue from conversational thinking that places the notion of relationship at the center of decolonial analysis, we argue that coloniality fractures the inter and intra-racial relationships due mainly to the instinct of self-preservation that overwhelms human rationality. What has emerged today as the superior/inferior divide, racialism, classism, internal colonialism, ethnic cleansing, apartheid, xenophobia, and genocide are some of the consequences of warped and uncritical thinking driven by an extreme form of the instinct of self-preservation. We argue that the promotion of critical (higher-order) thinking in addition to ordinary (lower-order) thinking could be crucial in a decolonial program. (shrink)

In this research, an attempt is made to interrogate the practice of intercultural philosophy with a view to showing that the critical thinking mindset is imperative for a balanced, progressive, and respectful intercultural engagement. A world in which cultures relate to one another on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and recognition of one another’s identity and rights has remained elusive. The need for such a world and the dynamics of such transcultural relations form the central themes of intercultural philosophy. (...) Specifically, this article argues that there can be no genuine intercultural discourse without the core values of critical thinking, such as open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, intellectual empathy, intellectual humility, intellectual perseverance, intellectual integrity, and intellectual courage. This article’s claim is that genuine intercultural engagement devoid of ego politics and the geopolitics of marginalization and superiorization must transcend the barriers of egocentrism and sociocentrism. Using an example of the conversational method, the authors interrogate critical thinking as an integral component of a viable intercultural discourse. (shrink)

We present an algorithm that can anticipate tax evasion by modeling the co-evolution of tax schemes with auditing policies. Malicious tax non-compliance, or evasion, accounts for billions of lost revenue each year. Unfortunately when tax administrators change the tax laws or auditing procedures to eliminate known fraudulent schemes another potentially more profitable scheme takes it place. Modeling both the tax schemes and auditing policies within a single framework can therefore provide major advantages. In particular we can explore the likely forms (...) of tax schemes in response to changes in audit policies. This can serve as an early warning system to help focus enforcement efforts. In addition, the audit policies can be fine tuned to help improve tax scheme detection. We demonstrate our approach using the iBOB tax scheme and show it can capture the co-evolution between tax evasion and audit policy. Our experiments shows the expected oscillatory behavior of a biological co-evolving system. (shrink)

Given its non-invasive nature, there is increasing interest in the use of transcutaneous vagus nerve stimulation across basic, translational and clinical research. Contemporaneously, tVNS can be achieved by stimulating either the auricular branch or the cervical bundle of the vagus nerve, referred to as transcutaneous auricular vagus nerve stimulation and transcutaneous cervical VNS, respectively. In order to advance the field in a systematic manner, studies using these technologies need to adequately report sufficient methodological detail to enable comparison of results between (...) studies, replication of studies, as well as enhancing study participant safety. We systematically reviewed the existing tVNS literature to evaluate current reporting practices. Based on this review, and consensus among participating authors, we propose a set of minimal reporting items to guide future tVNS studies. The suggested items address specific technical aspects of the device and stimulation parameters. We also cover general recommendations including inclusion and exclusion criteria for participants, outcome parameters and the detailed reporting of side effects. Furthermore, we review strategies used to identify the optimal stimulation parameters for a given research setting and summarize ongoing developments in animal research with potential implications for the application of tVNS in humans. Finally, we discuss the potential of tVNS in future research as well as the associated challenges across several disciplines in research and clinical practice. (shrink)

Given its non-invasive nature, there is increasing interest in the use of transcutaneous vagus nerve stimulation across basic, translational and clinical research. Contemporaneously, tVNS can be achieved by stimulating either the auricular branch or the cervical bundle of the vagus nerve, referred to as transcutaneous auricular vagus nerve stimulation and transcutaneous cervical VNS, respectively. In order to advance the field in a systematic manner, studies using these technologies need to adequately report sufficient methodological detail to enable comparison of results between (...) studies, replication of studies, as well as enhancing study participant safety. We systematically reviewed the existing tVNS literature to evaluate current reporting practices. Based on this review, and consensus among participating authors, we propose a set of minimal reporting items to guide future tVNS studies. The suggested items address specific technical aspects of the device and stimulation parameters. We also cover general recommendations including inclusion and exclusion criteria for participants, outcome parameters and the detailed reporting of side effects. Furthermore, we review strategies used to identify the optimal stimulation parameters for a given research setting and summarize ongoing developments in animal research with potential implications for the application of tVNS in humans. Finally, we discuss the potential of tVNS in future research as well as the associated challenges across several disciplines in research and clinical practice. (shrink)

To characterize human emotions, researchers have increasingly utilized Automatic Facial Expression Analysis (AFEA), which automates the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) and translates the facial muscular positioning into the basic universal emotions. There is broad interest in the application of FACS for assessing consumer expressions as an indication of emotions to consumer product-stimuli. However, the translation of FACS to characterization of emotions is elusive in the literature. The aim of this systematic review is to give an overview of how FACS (...) has been used to investigate human emotional behavior to consumer product-based stimuli. The search was limited to studies published in English after 1978, conducted on humans, using FACS or its action units to investigate affect, where emotional response is elicited by consumer product-based stimuli evoking at least one of the five senses. The search resulted in an initial total of 1,935 records, of which 55 studies were extracted and categorized based on the outcomes of interest including (i) method of FACS implementation; (ii) purpose of study; (iii) consumer product-based stimuli used; and (iv) measures of affect validation. Most studies implemented FACS manually (73%) to develop products and/or software (20%) and used consumer product-based stimuli that had known and/or defined capacity to evoke a particular affective response, such as films and/or movie clips (20%); minimal attention was paid to consumer products with low levels of emotional competence or with unknown affective impact. The vast majority of studies (53%) did not validate FACS-determined affect and, of the validation measures that were used, most tended to be discontinuous in nature and only captured affect as it holistically related to an experience. This review illuminated some inconsistencies in how FACS is carried out as well as how emotional response is inferred from facial muscle activation. This may prompt researchers to consider measuring the total consumer experience by employing a variety of methodologies in addition to FACS and its emotion-based interpretation guide. Such strategies may better conceptualize consumers' experience with products of low, unknown, and/or undefined capacity to evoke an affective response such as product prototypes, line extensions, etc. (shrink)

Men often make riskier decisions than women across a wide range of real-life behaviors. Whether this sex difference is accentuated, diminished, or stable under stressful conditions is, however, contested in the scientific literature. A critical blind spot lies amid this contestation: Most studies use standardized, laboratory-based, cognitive measures of decision making rather than complex real-life social simulation tasks to assess risk-related behavior. To address this blind spot, we investigated the effects of acute psychosocial stress on risk decision making in men (...) and women using a standardized cognitive measure and a novel task that simulated a real-life social situation. Participants were exposed to either an acute psychosocial stressor or an equivalent control condition. Stressor-exposed participants were further characterized as high- or low-cortisol responders. Results confirmed that the experimental manipulation was effective. On the IGT, participants characterized as low-cortisol responders made significantly riskier decisions than those characterized as high-cortisol responders. Similarly, in the online chatroom, participants characterized as low-cortisol responders were, relative to those in the Non-Stress group, significantly more likely to make risky decisions. Together, these results suggest that at lower levels of cortisol both men and women tend to make riskier decisions in both economic and social spheres. (shrink)

En este trabajo, el autor expone una visión de la filosofía hilemórfica o analógica de la mente, que se yergue como alternativa de superación entre el monismo materialista y el dualismo cartesiano. Procede localizando, primero, el lugar que le corresponde a esta visión filosófica en el marco de otras corrientes de filosofía de la mente. Posteriormente, y en seguimiento de algunos filósofos hilemorfistas, expone las tesis principales de esta postura filosófica.

Some of the most virulent public trans-exclusionary radical feminist discourse in the UK follows the grammatical form of the third conditional: if I had grown up now, I would have been persuaded to transition. This articulation of the hypothetical threat of a transition that did not happen but is imagined, in retrospect, to be not just possible but forcibly enacted plays an important role, both politically and psychically, in a contemporary political landscape that is threatening the livelihoods of trans children. (...) Interrogating this discourse via an analysis of an open letter by J.K. Rowling, and a documentary by Stella O’Malley, this article asks: what might we learn about contemporary transphobia in the UK if we took seriously the grammar of TERF discourse animated by trans childhood? It argues that while the third conditional grammar of TERF discourse could articulate a politics of solidarity between cis and trans positionalities and politics, its potential for a shared political standpoint is routinely interrupted by the defence mechanisms that are oriented by the psychic life of the child. Interrogating these defence mechanisms at the level of the cultural, the article traces out paranoia as well as projection, as two main modes of TERF engagement with trans childhood. The article thus engages with the range of real and fantasmatic impossibilities that haunt the trans child both in the present and the past, and it contributes to the growing body of scholarship on trans childhoods. In doing so, it makes the case that public discourse on trans children should desist from hypothetical third conditional claims, and instead find ways of embracing trans childhoods unconditionally. (shrink)

En este texto, el autor se confronta al enigma mayor del pensamiento de Nietzsche, el del Eterno Retorno de lo Mismo. Tras criticar sus interpretaciones hoy dominantes, la de Heidegger, que hace de él un modo de despliegue de la voluntad de poder, la de Deleuze, que ve en él un «eterno retorno del Otro», muestra que la afirmación del Retorno fractura el pensamiento de Nietzsche deconstruyendo la onto-lógica del superhombre y de la voluntad de poder. Propone entonces una nueva (...) lectura del Retorno centrada sobre la cuestión de la afectividad, de la posibilidad de una transfiguración de los afectos. (shrink)

The article analyses the constitution of subjectivity in Ruben Östlund’s film Force Majeure. At the centre of attention stands the male protagonist who is uncapable of reconciling his inner nature with the external expectations. If the film may be un- derstood as a critique of existing middle-class conventions, it also reproduces a highly conventional ideal of the self-identical subject. The article argues that this confusion or irony is an expression of a Cartesian subject – still prevalent in the film – (...) in crisis. A neglected aspect of Descartes’ theory is that the autonomy of the subjects presupposes the existence of God. The problem for Östlund’s char- acters is that there is no God. Still, they act as if he, or as if any au- thority might, legitimize their subjectivity. Thus, the whole existence becomes a series of performances. The idea of an inner nature cor- responds with the notion of an outer nature. The latter is certainly very present in Force Majeure, but at the same time this nature is constantly problematized. On an allegorical level, the film may thus be read as a comment on the Anthropocene, a state where we no longer know neither what “nature”, nor “culture” is. (shrink)

A “expropriação dos expropriadores” é uma deliciosa formulação, uma que Marx até compara à infame “negação da negação” de Hegel. Mas o que essa frase significa, e seria ela relevante ainda hoje? Antes de analisar o conteúdo da expressão de Marx, irei considerar brevemente os entendimentos jurídicos contemporâneos sobre a expropriação, bem como alguns exemplos. No restante do ensaio, apresento diferentes tipos de expropriação em Marx e me concentro em uma ambiguidade no cerne da noção de “expropriação dos expropriadores”, a (...) saber, se ela descreve uma tendência imanente e objetiva dentro do desenvolvimento do modo de produção capitalista ou se prescreve ativamente uma forma de práxis política revolucionária para a classe trabalhadora. Minha resposta é que ela faz as duas coisas, embora não sem tensionamento. Por fim, desenvolvo algumas implicações dessas reflexões, mostrando como o conceito de expropriação pode ser usado hoje, nas lutas em torno da moradia, da questão climática e do trabalho. (shrink)

This essay deals critically with Nietzsche’s anthropological typology of the “free spirit par excellence”, “we spirits”, persons endowed with positive as against negative powers, and the ideal of the Übermensch. From this presentation, which actually amounts to a concise summary of my various publications on Nietzsche, I draw two conclusions: The first, and quite surprising one, is that it was not Nietzsche’s ideal of the Übermensch that was the pinnacle of his anthropological philosophy but the even more ideal type of (...) the “free spirit par excellence”. The second, and less surprising, conclusion asserts that a society consisting of such “free spirits” is impossible. This finding will be highlighted by contrasting the Übermenschen, who, according to Nietzsche, need society as a sine qua non for their cultivation, with free spirits par excellence, who, by definition, are free from any need of a society. We will see, however, that on Nietzsche’s terms the ideal of the Übermensch is also not viable in society. Hence this paper points to an inherent flaw in Nietzsche’s existential philosophy -- the non-viability of its most sublime ideals. Nonetheless, one has to speculate about Nietzsche’s reasons for introducing the ideal of the free spirit par excellence -- an ideal that he himself thought to be existentially impractical. (shrink)

This essay deals critically with Nietzsche’s anthropological typology of the “free spirit par excellence”, “we spirits”, persons endowed with positive as against negative power patterns, and the ideal of the Übermensch. The conclusions are twofold. The first is that actually it was not Nietzsche’s ideal of the Overman that was the pinnacle of his anthropological philosophy, but the even more ideal type of the “free spirit par excellence”. The second conclusion is that it is impossible to envisage a society consisting (...) of such “free spirits”. This thesis is highlighted by contrasting the society of Übermenchen, who, according to Nietzsche, might live in society and even need it as a sine qua non for their cultivation, with free spirits par excellence, who are by definition free from any social ethos, and hence impossible within its framework. However, I argue that, on Nietzsche’s terms, the ideal of the Übermench is also not viable in society. Hence this essay points to an inherent flaw ofNietzsche’s existential philosophy -- thenon-viability of its most sublime ideals. (shrink)

In the opening essay of The Muses, Nancy asks what force disperses Art into a plurality of arts, and what simultaneously holds them together in the unity of Art, through this very dispersal. The idea of Art, as a plurality of irreducible singularities that nevertheless commune, developed in the essay, is a precursor to the ontology of Being Singular Plural, widely considered one of his most important works. The claim in The Muses is not only that art itself has to (...) be understood as a unity of a plurality of singularities, but that it is a privileged site for the revealing of the singular plural of being. The following essay explores Nancy’s ontology of art, which is simultaneously a way of understanding being in terms of art, by tracing it back to Merleau-Ponty. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the sense of being in terms of the “chiasm” (the touching-touched) in The Visible and the Invisible is a crucial source for Nancy’s pluralist ontology. The turn to Merleau-Ponty is framed as a way of emphasizing that Nancy remains committed to a philosophical or ontological idea of art (despite his own criticisms of the very idea) against those who would like to separate his pluralist idea of art from any reference to the question of the meaning of “being.” The argument is that radical pluralism requires, paradoxically, an ontology, just as the affirmation of the irreducible plurality of singular arts requires a notion of Art. Dans l’essai qui ouvre Les muses, Nancy se demande quelle force disperse l’Art dans les arts et retient simultanément leur dispersion dans l’unité de l’Art. L’idée d’Art en tant qu’une pluralité irréductible de singularités qui communient malgré ou grâce à cette pluralité, telle qu’elle est développée dans cet essai, constitue un précurseur de l’ontologie présentée dans Être singulier pluriel, un des ouvrages les plus importants de Nancy. Cet article explore l’ontologie de l’art nancéenne, qui est aussi à la fois une façon de comprendre l’être en tant qu’art, en en retraçant les racines chez Merleau-Ponty. Je soutiens que la compréhension du sens de l’être comme chiasme (touchant-touché) chez le Merleau-Ponty du Visible et l’invisible est une source décisive de l’ontologie pluraliste de Nancy. Le recours à Merleau-Ponty permet de souligner le fait que Nancy demeure attaché à une idée philosophique ou ontologique de l’art, malgré ses propres critiques de l’idée même. Cette interprétation va à l’encontre de celles qui chercheraient à détacher le concept pluraliste d’art chez Nancy de toute référence à la question du sens de l’« être ». Ma contention est que le pluralisme radical requiert, paradoxalement, une ontologie, de la même façon que l’affirmation de l’irréductible pluralité des arts singuliers requiert une notion d’Art.Nel saggio che apre Le muse, Nancy si domanda quale forza disperda l’Arte in una pluralità di arti, e cosa al contempo mantenga queste ultime legate nell’unità dell’Arte a dispetto di questa dispersione stessa. L’idea di Arte, sviluppata in questo saggio, come pluralità di singolarità irriducibili che nonostante tutto si trovano a contatto e in comunicazione, prelude all’ontologia di Essere singolare plurale, tra le opere più importanti di Nancy. Ne Le muse Nancy sostiene non soltanto che l’arte in sé debba essere concepita come l’unità di una pluralità di singolarità, ma anche che essa sia un luogo privilegiato per il rivelarsi del singolare plurale dell’essere. Questo articolo esplora l’ontologia dell’arte di Nancy, che è al contempo un modo di comprendere l’essere nei termini dell’arte, attraverso un richiamo a Merleau-Ponty. Mi propongo così di mostrare che la concezione del senso dell’essere di Merleau-Ponty nei termini del “chiasmo” (il “toccante-toccato”), espressa ne Il visibile e l’invisibile, sia una fonte cruciale per l’ontologia pluralista di Nancy. Il richiamo a Merleau-Ponty è volto a sottolineare come Nancy rimanga fedele a un’idea filosofica o ontologica di arte (nonostante le sue stesse critiche a questa idea), in opposizione a coloro che vorrebbero separare la sua idea pluralista di arte da qualunque riferimento alla questione del significato dell’“essere”. La mia tesi è che il pluralismo radicale richieda, paradossalmente, un’ontologia, esattamente come l’affermazione della pluralità irriducibile delle arti singolari richiede la nozione di Arte. (shrink)

: Fodor was passionately unwilling to compromise. Of his several commitments, I focus here on informational atomism. Fodor staunchly rejected semantic holism for two conspiring reasons. He took it to threaten his commitment to the nomic character of psychological explanation. He also took it to pave the way towards relativism, which he found deeply offensive. In this paper, I reconstruct the strands of Fodor’s commitment to the computational version of the representational theory of mind that led him to informational atomism. (...) I take issue with three features of informational atomism. First, I argue that it deprives content from its expected causal role in psychological explanation. Secondly, I take issue with Fodor’s claim that only informational atomism can meet the requirements of the principle of compositionality. Finally, I argue that informational atomism yields a bloated or unwieldy category of nomic properties. Keywords: Informational Atomism; Representational Theory of Mind; Psychological Explanation; Principle of Compositionality; Jerry A. Fodor Fare i conti con l’atomismo informazionale: uno dei lasciti di Jerry Fodor Riassunto : Fodor è stato fortemente maldisposto al compromesso. Tra le molte cose di cui si è occupato, intendo qui concentrarmi sull’atomismo informazionale. Fodor ha coerentemente rifiutato l’olismo semantico per due ragioni convergenti. Lo vedeva come minaccia per il suo impegno verso il carattere nomico della spiegazione psicologica e come porta aperta verso il relativismo, cosa che considerava profondamente minacciosa. In questo lavoro, intendo riprendere le fila dell’impegno di Fodor verso la versione computazionale della teoria rappresentazionale della mente che lo ha portato all’atomismo informazionale, chiarendo tuttavia che non sono d’accordo con tre aspetti dell’atomismo informazionale. In primo luogo, mostrerò come questo sottragga al contenuto il suo ruolo causale nella spiegazione psicologica. In secondo luogo, non sono d’accordo con l’affermazione di Fodor per cui solo l’atomismo informazionale possa soddisfare i requisiti del principio di composizionalità. Illustrerò infine come l’atomismo informazionale ceda il passo a un insieme di proprietà nomiche ampio o difficile da gestire. Parole chiave: Atomismo informazionale; Teoria rappresentazionale della mente; Spiegazione psicologica; Principio di composizionalità; Jerry A. Fodor. (shrink)

Though foreign—and perhaps shocking—to many in the west, the doctrine of theosis is central in the theology and practice of Eastern Orthodoxy. Theosis is “the ultimate goal of human existence”1 and indeed is “a way of summing up the purpose of creation”:2 That God will unite himself to all of creation with humanity at the focal point. What are human persons, that they might be united to God? That is the question I explore in this paper. In particular, I explore (...) an account of human nature inspired by an Eastern Orthodox conception of theosis. In section 1, I present a theological vision of theosis in the Eastern Church. In section 2, I offer an interpretation of what it might mean for human nature to become deformed by the fall and transformed by the Incarnation. Then, in section 3, I present an (admittedly speculative) account of human nature, based on a robustly metaphysical reading of an Orthodox conception of theosis. On that account—to overly simplify things, and postponing important qualifications—we might say that a human being is the union of soul and body with God. Finally, given that account of human nature, I offer in section 3 some brief reflections on the prospects of a scientific anthropology. (shrink)

I explore two accounts of properties within a dispositional essentialist (or causal powers) framework, the pure powers view and the powerful qualities view. I first attempt to clarify precisely what the pure powers view is, and then raise objections to it. I then present the powerful qualities view and, in order to avoid a common misconception, offer a restatement of it that I shall call the truthmaker view. I end by briefly defending the truthmaker view against objections.

En este artículo, el autor busca poner de manifiesto cómo es que la ética de la virtud está enmarcada en una “teoría ética”, por lo cual no es necesario completarla con una teoría ética externa a ella, como serían el pragmatismo, el emotivismo o el criticismo. Ya la ética de la virtud posee una teoría ética que la vuelve consistente, y muestra de ello es la filosofía moral de Rosmini, que puede encuadrarse dentro de la tradición clásica de la filosofía (...) moral. (shrink)

In the first half of this article, the author argues that the notion of criticizability plays a central role in the communicative rationality that Jiirgen Habermas proposes. He also identifies the incurable errors that Habermas recognizes in the philosophy of consciousness, and explains how Habermas thinks the concept of communicative rationality overcomes these errors. At the end of this discussion, he shows how the theory of communicative action suffers from vague and unsatisfying treatments of the key philosophical issues of cognition (...) and objectivity, and suggests that these deficiencies in the theory result from Habermas's desire to avoid all things subject-centered and metaphysical. In the latter half of the article, the author discusses the cognitional theory of Bernard Lonergan and shows how it (1) avoids the legitimate criticisms Habermas raises against the philosophy of consciousness and (2) supplements and complements the theory of communicative action. /// Na primeira parte do presente artigo, o autor defende que a noção de critica-bilidade desempenha um papel central na racionalidade comunicativa proposta por Jürgen Habermas. Aí são também identificados os erros insanáveis que Habermas reconhece na filosofia da consciência, e se explica de que modo Habermas pensa que o conceito de racionalidade comunicativa supera esses erros. No final da discussão, porém, o autor do artigo mostra até que ponto a teoria da acção comunicativa padece de tratamentos vagos e insatisfatórios de questões filosóficas chave relativas à cognição e à objectividade, sugerindo que estas deficiências na teoria resultam do desejo de Habermas de evitar tudo o que seja centrado no sujeito e de natureza metafísica. Na segunda grande porção do artigo, o autor discute a teoria cognitiva de Bernard Lonergan procurando demonstrar de que modo ela (1) evita as críticas legítimas de Habermas relativamente à filosofia da consciência e (2) suplementa e complementa a teoria da acção comunicativa. (shrink)

Brian Earp’s and Julian Savulescu’s provocatively titled “Love Drugs: The Chemical Future of Relationships” is a philosophically rigorous, scientifically informed, and yet wholly accessible study o...

Este texto se caracteriza como debate alinhado com os esforços para lidar com o fenômeno biológico, ecológico e social desencadeado pelo vírus Corona 19 tendo como foco a abordagem amparada na Fenomenologia Schiller-Goethiana, e na Pedagogia da Pachamama/Tayta Inti com a decorrente posição anti-colonial e a abordagem trans e inter educativa sustentada em conhecimentos ancestrais e originários e nas abordagens teóricas da física contemporânea. Tem o propósito de debater possibilidades teóricas e práticas que proporcionem vida futura que atenda ao desafio (...) pós pandêmico de forma a romper fronteiras e promover emancipação a favor da vida com dignidade. (shrink)

Europska komisija je od 1995. do 1998. podupirala istraživački projekt »Temeljni etički principi u europskoj bioetici i biopravu« . Projekt se temeljio na suradnji 22 partnera iz većine država Europske unije. Cilj projekta bio je identificirati etičke principe povezane s autonomijom, dostojanstvom, integritetom i ranjivošću kao četirima važnim idejama ili vrijednostima za europsku bioetiku i biopravo. Važan sažetak BIOMED projekta bio je Prijedlog Smjernica Europskoj komisiji – Deklaracija iz Barcelone iz 1998. godine – koja je jedinstvena jer predstavlja filozofsku i (...) političku suglasnost stručnjaka za bioetiku i biopravo iz mnogih država. U ovome tekstu želimo usporediti Deklaraciju iz Barcelone sa nekim drugim novijim međunarodnim dokumentima o bioetici i biopravu. Povezat ćemo Deklaraciju iz Barcelone sa okvirom koji nude različiti međunarodni dokumenti i propisi o djelovanju u bioetici i biopravu. Posebno ćemo se usmjeriti na sličnosti i razlike sa Konvencijom o zaštiti ljudskih prava i dostojanstva ljudskih bića u pogledu primjene biologije i medicine, koju je prihvatilo Vijeće ministara 1996., te ćemo promotriti i UNESCOvu Deklaraciju o ljudskom genomu iz 1997. Dakle, Deklaracija iz Barcelone ne predstavlja samo europske etičke principe u bioetici i biopravu, nego ujedno pojašnjava i artikulira osnovne etičke principe koji se nalaze u središtu međunarodnog interesa za univerzalnu bioetiku i biopravo. (shrink)

En este artículo, se busca poner de realce un tema poco advertido en la filosofía moral de Antonio Rosmini. Se trata de la diferencia entre juicio ético y juicio práctico: podrían parecer expresiones sinónimas, pero en realidad guardan una enorme diferencia, análoga a la que se da entre la dimensión teórica (filosófica) y práctica de la vida diaria. El artículo muestra, siguiendo los textos rosminianos, especialmente el Trattato della coscienza morale, que los juicios éticos son fórmulas morales que constituyen la (...) ciencia de la moral, pero no su realización, mientras que los juicios prácticos son el acto voluntario por el cual se vuelve efectiva una formulación ética, o por el que se aplica una fórmula moral y modifica el estatuto real del mundo. El juicio ético es un juicio teórico y, por ende, se diferencia netamente del juicio práctico que da inicio al acto moral. Puede decirse que ambos versan sobre la dimensión moral, por lo que pertenecen al género de los juicios morales, pero se diferencian en cuanto los éticos son meramente éticos, mientras que cuando se vuelven principio del acto moral, toman el nombre de prácticos. (shrink)

Genetic moderation of experience of reward in response to environmental stimuli is relevant for the study of many psychiatric disorders. Experience of reward, however, is difficult to capture, as it involves small fluctuations in affect in response to small events in the flow of daily life. This study examined a momentary assessment reward phenotype in relation to the catechol-O-methyl transferase (COMT) Val158Met polymorphism. A total of 351 participants from a twin study participated in an Experience Sampling Method procedure to collect (...) daily life experiences concerning events, event appraisals, and affect. Reward experience was operationalized, as the effect of event appraisal on positive affect (PA). Associations between COMT Val 158Met genotype and event appraisal on the one hand and PA on the other were examined using multilevel random regression analysis. Ability to experience reward increased with the number of ‘Met’ alleles of the subject, and this differential effect of genotype was greater for events that were experienced as more pleasant. The effect size of genotypic moderation was quite large: subjects with the Val/Val genotype generated almost similar amounts of PA from a ‘very pleasant event’ as Met/Met subjects did from a ‘bit pleasant event’. Genetic variation with functional impact on cortical dopamine tone has a strong influence on reward experience in the flow of daily life. Genetic moderation of ecological measures of reward experience is hypothesized to be of major relevance to the development of various behavioral disorders, including depression and addiction. Neuropsychopharmacology (2008) 33, 3030–3036; doi:10.1038/sj.npp.1301520; published online 8 August 2007.. (shrink)

RESUMENEn la obra de Schelling se exhibe el esfuerzo de éste por aclarar el ideal trascendental kantiano, mediante los conceptos platónicos de peras y apeiron. En el presente artículo lo que se expone es dicho esfuerzo: tanto en el texto temprano de Schelling del Timeo, 1794; como en sus últimos textos, de la filosofía racional pura. Schelling diferencia, siguiendo a Kant en el ideal trascendental, la omnitudo realitatis respecto de aquello que ésta es. La omnituto realitatis la aclara a través (...) de los conceptos platónicos de peras y apeiron. En esta explicación consigue mantener libre respecto de la omnitudo realitatis eso que el ente –en un sentido eminente– es. O dicho de otro modo: pensar mundo y Dios de modo que éste sea pensado como independiente y libre frente al proceso del mundo.Palabras clavesIdeal trascendental kantiano, peras, apeiron, ser universal, ser individual absolutoABSTRACTSchelling’s work shows his effort to clarify the transcendental Kantian ideal through the platonic concepts of peras and apeiron. The article below describes this effort, in his early text Timaeus, 1794 as well as in his later texts, about rational pure philosophy. Schelling distinguishes, following Kant in the transcendental ideal, the omnitudo realitatis from what it actually is. The omnitudo realitatis is explained through the concepts of peras and apeiron. In this explanation what the entity is –in an eminent sense– remains free from the omnitudo realitatis. In other words: the thought of the world and God in a sense that you can think about God independently and apart from the world process.KeywordsThe transcendental kantian ideal, peras, apeiron, the universal being, the absolute individual being. (shrink)

RESUMENEn la obra de Schelling se exhibe el esfuerzo de éste por aclarar el ideal trascendental kantiano, mediante los conceptos platónicos de peras y apeiron. En el presente artículo lo que se expone es dicho esfuerzo: tanto en el texto temprano de Schelling del Timeo, 1794; como en sus últimos textos, de la filosofía racional pura. Schelling diferencia, siguiendo a Kant en el ideal trascendental, la omnitudo realitatis respecto de aquello que ésta es. La omnituto realitatis la aclara a través (...) de los conceptos platónicos de peras y apeiron. En esta explicación consigue mantener libre respecto de la omnitudo realitatis eso que el ente –en un sentido eminente– es. O dicho de otro modo: pensar mundo y Dios de modo que éste sea pensado como independiente y libre frente al proceso del mundo.Palabras clavesIdeal trascendental kantiano, peras, apeiron, ser universal, ser individual absolutoABSTRACTSchelling’s work shows his effort to clarify the transcendental Kantian ideal through the platonic concepts of peras and apeiron. The article below describes this effort, in his early text Timaeus, 1794 as well as in his later texts, about rational pure philosophy. Schelling distinguishes, following Kant in the transcendental ideal, the omnitudo realitatis from what it actually is. The omnitudo realitatis is explained through the concepts of peras and apeiron. In this explanation what the entity is –in an eminent sense– remains free from the omnitudo realitatis. In other words: the thought of the world and God in a sense that you can think about God independently and apart from the world process.KeywordsThe transcendental kantian ideal, peras, apeiron, the universal being, the absolute individual being. (shrink)

If one regards an ordinal number as a generalization of a counting number, then it is natural to begin thinking in terms of computations on sets of ordinal numbers. This is precisely what Takeuti [22] had in mind when he initiated the study of recursive functions on ordinals. Kreisel and Sacks [9] too developed an ordinal recursion theory, called metarecursion theory, which specialized to the initial segment of the ordinals bounded by.The notion of admissibility was introduced by Kripke [11] and (...) Platek [14] and served to generalize metarecursion theory. Kripke called ordinal α admissible if it satisfied certain closure properties of infinitary computations. It was shown that admissibility could be equivalently formulated in terms of the replacement schema of ZF set theory and that α =is an admissible ordinal. The study of a recursion theory on an initial segment of the ordinals bounded by some arbitrary admissible α became known as α-recursion theory.Kripke [10] employed a Gödel numbering scheme to perform an arithmetiza-tion of α -recursion theory and created an analogue to Kleene'sT-predicate of ordinary recursion theory. TheT-predicate then served as the basis for showing that analogues of the major results of unrelativized o.r.t. held in α-recursion theory; namely, the α-Enumeration Theorem,T Theorem, α-Recursion Theorem, and α-Universal Function Theorem. (shrink)